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1. Introduction  
Justice is a cardinal pillar of Igbo judicial and legal systems. 
The Igbo have a very strong sense of justice which is littered in 
many an Igbo cultural ethos and pathos.  The proverbs, idioms, 
folklores, folk songs and other linguistic sources are some important 
purveyors of this value system. Igbo justice is practised in land 
matters, inheritance issues, socio-communal development strategies, 
interpersonal relationships and sundry avenues. This paper seeks to 
examine these sources and scenarios with a view to deciphering the 
fundamental concepts and principles of autochthonous Igbo justice 
system. It will equally inquire into whether or not the principles and 
practice of justice in traditional Igbo enclave are still sustainable in 
the light of the present wave of globalization. This study will be 
capped with a juxtaposition of traditional justice administration with 
the prevailing Nigerian justice/legal system. In other words, it will 
examine the status and position of indigenous system vis-à-vis 
English-style regime imbibed, as it were, in Nigerian jurisprudence 
as part of colonial legacy. Our methodology will be largely critical 
and analytic.   
 
2. Igbo Sociology and Worldview Described 
The Igbo people constitute one of the major tribal groups in 
Nigeria today. According to the colonial geography, the Igbo occupy 
mainly the eastern part of the country. They are today found in high 
concentration in Anambra, Abia, Enugu, Ebonyi and Imo States of 
Nigeria. There are also large Igbo populations in Delta and River 
States. Igbo people are a very migrant race. They are in large 
numbers resident in Northern Nigeria and in Old Ogoja, Calabari, 
Benin, and Lagos. More, Igbo migrants trooped out to the 
Cameroons, Gabon, Congo Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, Central 
African Republic, and recently to all parts of ECOWAS sub-region 
and the South Africa. And apart from the trans-Atlantic slave trade 
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 centuries have also witnessed an 
unprecedented influx of the people into the Western world perhaps 
in search of greener pastures. More so, as a result of cultural 
diffusion experienced both by the home front due to colonial 
incursion and neocolonialism and by the Diaspora who presently are 
in serious romance with the western culture, much of the traditional 
practices have undergone serious modification. This is certainly 
consequent upon Igbo receptivity and amenability to change.
1
 
Hence, the Igbo traditional socio-political institutions notably 
communalism, “communitism”, republicanism and religion have 
been drastically altered and modulated by imperialist incursion and 
Igbo access to western education, culture, Christianity and 
capitalism. City consciousness and urbanity have become integral 
components of the Igbo society. Onitsha, Aba, Enugu, Owerri, 
Umuahia, Awka, Nnewi, Agbor, Asaba and Abakaliki are fast 
growing Igbo cities populated, as it were, by hitherto rural dwellers. 
Another stamp of ‘westernism’ is made manifest in physical 
structures such as roads, streets, electricity, hospitals, building 
architecture, house furniture and home facilities, and so on. 
Yet, in spite of the above foreign influence and more, certain 
traditional practices are quite resilient. In the hinterland, some 
traditional Igbo communities live in dispersed settlements. The Igbo 
village, which is a small face-to-face society, is still easily 
recognizable. A number of closely clustered compounds and families 
form the Igbo village, and several villages make up towns. Again, 
despite modern alterations, the Igbo traditional political institutions 
that are designed to combine popular participation with weighing for 
experience and ability are still in tandem with extended family 
sociology. The family head, the elders, the age grade, secret 
societies, masquerade cults, etc play a leading role in this socio-
political structure. Economically, the Igbo in the urban areas are 
traders and crafts-men. In the rural areas, they are largely farmers. 
But in modern times, a good number are professionals in the areas of 
law, science, medicine, and management. The people embrace 
Christianity in large numbers. However, much of Igbo traditional 
living and attitudes is still conditioned by its traditional worldview  




which is described by Nwala as “the Igbo complex of beliefs, habits, 
laws, customs and tradition of reality”.
2
 
In spite of the relatively new religion of Christianity, the 
Igbo anthropology habours a widespread belief in supreme and 
unique God. Chukwu (the Great Spirit), Chineke (the Creator Spirit), 
Osebuluuwa (the Lord who upholds the world), Ezechitoke (the 
Spirit King Creator), Okasiakasi (the Greatest Being), etc are some 
of the names with which this God is addressed. The traditional Igbo 
people also believe in the lesser spirits, and the ancestors through 
whom they can also go to Chukwu.  
Igbo worldview also exudes a manifest anthropocentricism. 
This is the view that man occupies the central position in any 
meaningful human activity including religion. Writing about African 
worldview generally, Metuh holds that “everything seems to get its 
bearing and significance from the position, meaning and end of 
man”.
3
 This is also true of the Igbo for whom in spite of the deep 
respect and recognition of innumerable divinities, the relevance 
thereof is very much subject to their effect on man.
4
 Hence, the Igbo 
have a functional, pragmatic and do ut des approach to religion and 
culture. Sequel to this anthropocentric sensibility is the life-
affirming character of Igbo worldview that is often celebrated in 
rituals, festivals and ceremonies. The Igbo esteem life, value it, 
celebrate it and do anything to protect and sustain it.  
Further, the traditional Igbo view reality in a non-
compartmentalized manner. Their political, social, economic, 
cultural, moral, legal and religious aspects of life form a continuum. 
Everything seems to have a profound religious substractum mostly 
in order to enhance human life hic et nunc. It is this practical socio-
religious framework that informs the traditional Igbo notion of 
justice. 
 
3. Justice Defined 
There is no generally accepted definition of justice. 
Etymologically, however, justice derives from the Latin “ius – 
iustus” meaning “law”, a legal right. In this sense, “law” and 
“justice” would be synonymous terms. But this is a misnomer. What 
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is more correct is that law is to justice what a means is to an end, or 
a cause to an effect. Thus, apart from this etymological denotation, 
justice means many things and sometimes different things to many 
scholars for which there are myriad theories of justice. For the 
positivists, justice is seen as conformity to the law. For the social 
right theorists, justice is seen as doing what promotes the social 
good. But for the natural law theorists, justice is tied to the idea of 
natural rights where right is regarded as the ultimate basis of justice.
5
 
Besides, different scholars and jurists have also expressed their own 
ideas of justice. For instance, following Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas 
defines justice as “firm and constant will to give each one his due”.
6
 
Similarly, Spinoza identifies justice with the “habitual rendering to 
everyman his lawful due”.
7




Be that as it may, the concept of justice is a very rich one. 
Justice has been classified into moral, civil, criminal, distributive, 
commutative, retributive, substantial, commercial, divine, private, 
social, compensatory, vindictive, conservative, legal, penal justice, 
and so on. In what immediately follows, this study will examine the 
notion of justice in Igbo traditional Igbo thought forms. 
 
4. Principles of Justice in Traditional Igbo Mindset: Theoretical 
Perspectives 
In order to discover the primordial sense of justice among 
the traditional Igbo, it may be necessary to first and foremost, 
analyze the Igbo words for justice: “akankwumoto” and 
“ikpenkwumoto”. While “akankwumoto” denotes justice as a virtue 
of a particular person, “ikpenkwumoto” or “ikpeziriezi” refers to the 
expression of this virtue in practical judgment at the event of 
dispute. The latter can also be described as truthfulness in making 
judicial decisions. 
Etymologically, “akankwumoto” derives from three other 
Igbo words: “aka” (hand), “nkwu” (stand, remain, stay), and “oto” 
(straight, erect, upright, not crooked, etc). Thus, the word 
“akankwumoto” literally means keeping one’s hand straight. It 
denotes uprightness of conduct. In the same vein “ikpenkwumoto” 
stems from “ikpe” (judgement, case, decision, verdict), “kwu” 




(stand, stay, remain), and “oto” (straight, erect). Literally, 
“ikpenkwumoto” means judgement that is straight. The analysis of 
these two Igbo words shows that the Igbo concept of justice stresses 
the notion of physical straightness akin to the meaning of the 
Hebrew “sedaqa”.
9
 This idea of straightness in relation to justice 
can refer to an action or person. In the former sense, it means that 
one’s life is straight-forward, upright, honest, predictable and 
impartial. In the latter understanding, a just action is one that is not 
crooked, is performed as it should be, is done in a disinterested 
manner, or has followed a due process. 
But on a more profound consideration, the word 
“akankwumoto” derives from the context of farming on the land 
which was largely the main occupation of the traditional Igbo. The 
traditional Igbo owned land family by family. That is to say a large 
piece of land instead of to a private individual and sometimes to a 
community belonged to an extended family. It is only by way of 
temporary partition that each nuclear family or individual got a 
specific piece of land to cultivate. Even up till today, this practice of 
communal ownership of land is still prevalent in the hinterland. In 
order to divide the land among nuclear families, since the Igbo had 
no theodolite or official surveyors for that purpose, they normally 
chose young men who were of good reputation, trusted by 
community and known for their previous experience of keeping their 
hands straight while dividing the farm land. In addition to these 
qualities, the young men must be willing to undertake the difficulties 
involved in going through the equatorial scrub during the process of 
division in order to make sure that a straight line is maintained. 
Above all, they must be docile to listen to the wise counsel of the 
elders who intermittently advised them in these words: “Nwa m 
kwuba aka gi oto” (My son keep your hand straight), or “Emegbuna 
onye obula” (Do not cheat anybody). It is in this sense of 
straightness in dividing the farm land that “akankwumoto” came to 
denote the idea of justice in traditional Igbo sensibility. It is thus by 
extrapolation that “Ikpenkwumoto” also became an explanation for a 
just judgment emanating from a just and straightforward man. 
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Be that as it may, Nzomiwu observes that as the history of 
the Igbo people progressed, the words “akankwumoto” and 
“ikpenkwumoto” gathered a metaphorical and a more 
comprehensive meaning.
10
 According to this development, justice 
becomes any action that conforms to the omenala (tradition), which 
constitutes the grundnorm, to use kelson’s terminology.
11
 Justice, 
thus, becomes conformity with the requirements of the custom and 
tradition. A man who keeps the injunctions of Omenala which 
contains the duties of a citizen in all its ramifications is regarded as a 
just man. In the same vein, the word “ikpenkwumoto” became a 
judgement that conforms to the tradition (omenala). In other words, 
any judgment that is not consistent with the Omenala is not 
constitutional and as such null and void. Such a judgment cannot be 
binding on any party. It somewhat violates what the English law 
would call the principle of “stare decisis” and it is bound to be 
unjust (mmegbu) which condition aims at or attempts to deprive one 
of his life or entitlements. 
Besides, the Igbo sense of justice is quite condensed in Igbo 
oral tradition. Illustrations from two of the sources of this tradition 
may be helpful. Thus, justice is expressed in Igbo proverbs and 
names. Let us take them one by one. Among the Igbo people, the use 
of proverbs in the communication of ideas is very invaluable. A 
proverb for them is a figure of speech in which many lofty ideas and 
philosophy are concealed and congealed. In referring to African 
proverbs, Herskovits regards them as constituting the “grammar of 
values”.
12
 In proverbs are condensed the nitty gritties of Igbo 
customs, ethical standards, traditional wisdom, and wise sayings. For 
the Igbo, proverbs constitute the spice or salt of human 
communication (nnu e ji eri okwu). Certainly, the Igbo 
understanding of justice in all its ramifications is well expressed in 
various proverbs. Let us now give some instances of Igbo proverbs 
that explain different aspects of Igbo conception of justice. 
Firstly, there is a group of proverbs that emphasize the Igbo 
sociological philosophy of live-and-let-live, harmony, peaceful co-
existence, and consideration for the needs of others. Examples of 
these proverbs include “Egbe bere ugo bere nke si ibe ya ebela nku 
kwapu ya” (let the kite perch and let the eagle perch also, whichever 




denies the other its perching right, let its wings break off), Obiara be 
onye abiagbula ya, O ga-ana mkpumkpu apuna ya (The guest should 
not harm the host and while going home the host should see that he 
goes home peacefully, or literally, “may the peaceful visitor go 
home without a hunchback”), Okeleku amana uma taka akpa dibia 
ma dibia amana uma bu okelekwu onu (let the rat not eat furrows 
into the native doctor’s bag but let the native doctor not curse the rat 
for mere flimsy reasons), Onye anwuna ma ibe ya efuna (let nobody 
die nor let his neighbour get lost), Onye ilo m diri ma m diri (let my 
enemy live and let me also live), Iwe nwanne na-ewe adighi eru 
n’okpukpu (the anger against a brother does not penetrate down to 
the bone), etc. 
 
There is also the second group of proverbs that emphasize 
justice as co-responsibility within the community. Some instance 
can be quite illustrative: Ofu mkpulu aka luta mmanu o zue ndi ozo 
onu (when one finger gets soaked with palm oil, it quickly spreads to 
other fingers). This explains the social or corporate dimension of 
justice or injustice among the Igbo. Other proverbs under this group 
includes Aka nri kwoo aka ekpe aka ekpe akwoo aka nri (let the right 
hand wash the left hand and let the left hand wash the right hand, 
that both may be clean), Onye ji akwu toolu nchi na nchi adighi ali 
enu (whoever has palm nut let him drop some to grass-cutter because 
it does not climb). The implication is that among the Igbo, justice 
includes help to the needy and obligation to help the poor, the lowly 
and the helpless members of the society. Also among the proverbs 
that emphasize the value of corporation and community life in 
matters of common good is the one: A nyukoo mamiri onu ogboo 
ufufu (much foam would be made if many people urinate into a place 
together). 
More so, some proverbs describe Igbo sense of justice as 
equality of opportunity, metaphysical equality of all human beings, 
and justice as fairness especially within the context of a community. 
Ya bara onye bara onye (let the advantages or opportunity be 
equally shared) and Isi ntutu a karo ibe ya (no individual human 
being is greater than the other) are examples of such proverbs. 
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Furthermore, some group of proverbs stress the idea of penal 
and retributive justice for those who are opposed to the community 
goal or attempt to trample on other people’s rights. Such proverbs 
include Isi kote ebu ebu agbagbue ya (if any body attracts the bee, 
the bee will sting him to death), Ochu nwa okuku nwe ada (he who 
pursues the cock or the hen is the one to fall), Onye si anyi adina, ya 
bulu okuku uzo naba ura (may he who wishes us death experience it 
prematurely), Onye si ala adina mma, ya doo ya n’azu (let him who 
glories in sowing seeds of discord in the community not live to see 
order and harmony restored), Okpa nsi na okpa aja, aka nsi na aka 
aja ba ya onu (may he taste poison who seeks to poison others or 
may the perpetrator of injustice and disharmony be a victim of his 
very action), Okuku bere na ngige, ngige egwn okuku egwu 
(whenever a cock perches on a rope tied to two ends, both the cock 
and the rope will be dancing), Oji anyi amu ije ga-agho ngworo (let 
him be a cripple who uses us for a walking stick), etc.  
Finally, some proverbs assert the need for individual rights 
in spite of the community consciousness of the Igbo. E kechaa n’obi 
eke na mkpuke (after sharing on the basis of extended family,  there 
will be sharing on the basis of nuclear family), Nke m bu nke m, nke 
anyi bu nke anyi (my own is my own, our own is our own), Olu onye 
dokwa ya ndu (let one’s occupation provide for one’s old age), Nke 
onye diri ya (let each man enjoy his right), Nriko na nkeko egbunam 
(may I not die for living community life) are some instances of those 
proverbs that emphasize the respect for individual rights and 
entitlements. 
Yet another form of Igbo orature that conveys the Igbo 
conception of justice is found in the various names the Igbo give to 
their children. Unlike in some Euro-American cultures where 
importance is not so much attached to names for which Shakespeare 
asks the question: “What’s in a name”?, names are quite meaningful 
and symbolic in Igbo enclave. While some Europeans give such 
names like Kettle, Bush, Wood, Stone, and so on, to their children 
without much reasons therefor, the Igbo names are not just tags or 
mere sounds. Igbo names are not mere conventional nominalistic 
signs or verbal puffs but summarize one’s conception of the thing so 
named. Personal names are thought to reveal information about the 




bearer or describe the circumstances surrounding the birth of the 
bearer, or even explain the experiences of the bearer’s parents. 
Among the Igbo, to be nameless is to be worthless. The Igbo man 
regards his name not as a mere label, but as a distinct part of   his 
personality. For the Igbo, to know a person fully is to know his 
name. More still, in Igbo worldview, names reveal sentiments, 
aspirations and hopes. They are the most accurate and succinct 
records of the Igbo people’s beliefs, socio-ethical concepts and 
culture. Names portray the virtues the Igbo admire and the vices they 
detest. Above all, names sum up the features of the things to which 
they are attached. 
In line with the above mindset, some Igbo names express the 
concept of justice. It goes without saying that among the people, 
justice is symbolized with the word Ofo. Therefore, all Igbo names 
that have the word ofo as a suffix or prefix have one thing or the 
other to refer to or demonstrate about justice. A good number of 
these names show the importance, necessity, effectiveness and 
superiority of the virtue of justice over other virtues. Ofoka (justice 
is greater or superior), Ofodile (justice does not kill), Ofoma  (justice 
knows) are some examples of such Igbo names. Besides, some Igbo 
names express the Igbo contempt of and antipathy to certain 
practices or attitudes that smack of injustice. Nzomiwu
13
 observes 
two Igbo names that show scorn for unjust tendencies and thus warn 
the Igbo community of the danger of acting in accordance with such 
attitudes. The first name is Aboka which full expression is “Aboka 
Ife Atunye Isi” meaning that “revenge will kill or undo one”. By 
this, a man who is vindictive is warned that if he continues with such 
an attitude, he will suffer for it. In other words, by that name, the 
Igbo emphasize that retaliation and vindictiveness is not part of their 
understanding of justice. Hence, the idea of justice as reconciliation 
and forgiveness is extolled. Secondly, the name “Ikpeamaeze” 
which literally means “The King is never guilty” is quite illustrative 
of the Igbo rejection of injustice as violation of the principle of rule 
of law. A part of the meaning of rule of law according to Dicey is 
that every citizen is under the law and that no body is above it. All 
are subjected to the ordinary laws of the land as interpreted by the 





 Thus, by giving the name Ikpeamaeze, the highly 
republican and egalitarian Igbo political anthropology far from 
glorying in that state of affair expresses its disapproval for it. 
Although some scholars have another interpretation of this name, yet 
the end result is coterminous with a manifest consternation with 
which the Igbo view any acts that breach the principle of the rule of 
law. For instance, Nzomiwu anchors his explanation of the meaning 
of the name on the so-called “Igbo-enwe-eze” slogan. According to 
him, most Igbo communities had neither kings nor chiefs. He argues 
that the existence of chiefs now in many Igbo communities is a later 
development due to cross-cultural contact. Thus, the name 
‘Ikpeamaeze’ is used to scorn those communities that had kings and 
chiefs who naturally would never be imputed with guilt in any event. 
This is because being powerful, they would either by hook or crook, 
get justice on their sides. Hence, the name “Ikpeamaeze” expresses 
the Igbo disaffection and repudiation for the resultant miscarriage of 
justice. Nzomiwu’s point of departure based, as it were, on the so-
called “Igbo-enwe eze” is a highly controversial matter setting Igbo 
historians and anthropologists into hot debating camps but which 
discussion is beyond the scope of this study. However, Nzomiwu’s 
conclusions are in tandem with Igbo disapprobation with the fact 
that chiefs and kings do maneuver justice. More still, the Igbo 
traditional religious sensibility is also replete with the Igbo 
conception of justice. Some theophoric names the Igbo take bear this 
out. Chukwuma  (God knows), Chukwumanjo (God knows which is 
sinful or wicked), Chukwumaobi (God knows the secrets of the 
hearts), Chukwuobo (Revenge is God’s), Chukwugboo (May God 
Settle), Chukwunagbako (God keeps record of all things), 
Chuwkunweugwo (To reward belongs to God), Chukwunagolum 
(God testifies to my innocence) are some instances of such names. 
The Igbo therefore believe in the retributive justice of God whose 
actions are identified with justice and equity. He is “Chuwkujiofo” 
(God holds justice and equity). For the Igbo, God often dispenses 
this justice through the deities especially Ala (Earth Goddess), 
Ancestral spirits, masquerades, and man.
15
 
Even as Igbo sense of justice is also conveyed via the 
folklores, folksongs, rituals and mythologies, let the above 




discussions suffice for the theoretical consideration of the justice 
system. It may then be necessary to investigate the actual 
transmutation of the theory of justice into some practical matters by 
the traditional Igbo. 
 
5. Justice in Praxis among the Traditional Igbo 
There is no gainsaying the fact that the traditional Igbo 
theory of justice is frequently tested in a number of areas. We shall 
consider a few of these areas. 
 
(i) Criminal Matters 
Surely one salient means of practicing the Igbo concept of 
justice is criminal causes and matters. The Igbo recognize two main 
classes of offences: those that are “nso” and those that are not. 
Green refers to the former as taboos and to the latter as natural 
offences.
16
 The first group of offences is often identified as 
abomination (alu) which consists in acts regarded as violations 
against the divine laws. These range from murder, incest to theft of 
some highly valuable property such as yams. The second group of 
offences comprises the natural crimes such as other forms of 
stealing, failure to join in the community projects, and disobedience 
to other man-made laws. The Igbo retributive and penal justice is 
demonstrated in the punishments meted to the respective offenders 
which include death penalty in very extreme cases, ostracism, 
banishment, restitution, fine, compensation, forfeiture, seizure of 
valuable property, caricature and so on. But above all the Igbo 
criminal and penal justice systems are premised on the important 
value of reconciliation and peace-making. It is not necessarily based 
on the lex talionis approach of the hard core retributivism. There is 
thus an admixture of the retributive and utilitarian/ consequentialist 
modes that issue in the deterrent, rehabilitatory, reparatory, 
reformative, expiatory, educative and incapacitative objectives of 
penal jurisprudence. Suffused with a religio-moral and socio-cultural 
sensibilities, Igbo criminal justice is theandric comprising, as it 
were, the human and divine aspects. Sometimes, the gods are left to 
decide in cases that involve oath-taking and trial by ordeal. 




(ii) Inheritance Issues 
Another window through which the Igbo practice justice is 
inheritance issues. However, in this regard, justice is more or less 
practised in terms of equity rather than equality. It is therefore 
according to this sense that the property of a man who died intestate 
is inherited by male children alone. If he had no male children, the 
inheritance goes to the brothers. Female children are not normally 
seen as heirs in traditional Igbo anthropology for they are regarded 
as transient soon to be married out of the family. Wives are also not 
to inherit the husband’s property since they themselves are 
inheritable. Inheritance is therefore thought to belong to males on 
whom it is believed that the burden of family responsibility and 
upkeep lies. Even when a part of the inherited property is in the 
custody of the wife, for instance, the wife is taken to be a mere 
trustee thereof for the benefit of the male children especially. Thus, 
Igbo sense of justice in terms of inheritance matters is administered 
in accordance with the need and maturity of the heir instead of by 
arithmetical equality. 
 
(iii) Land Disputes 
It is not for nothing that the Igbo concept of justice is 
expressed in the term “akankwumoto” which is derived from the 
ambience of land distribution. The Igbo have their main occupation 
as farming and agriculture and as such have an unprecedented 
attachment to land. In addition to this, one’s land is almost an 
absolutely inalienable property.  Until recently, lands were a 
communal property which could be partitioned to individuals for 
settlement and farming purposes. At the event of boundary dispute 
or trespass, the Igbo sense of justice was brought to bear by way of 
traditional history and adjudicated over by the Council of Elders. In 
the olden days when the use of block fence was not yet made, 
boundaries were effected by the use of some resilient trees such as 
“ebenebe” and “ogirishi” which can survive the adverse effects of 
various weathers. In land disputes, what is therefore just is identified 
with the goodness of the title and correspondence with boundary. 
 




(iv) Marital / Family Tension 
The family is an important institution in traditional Igbo 
sociology. It is equally the grassroot of Igbo politics. In the family, 
the husband and wife or wives unite to raise up children for the 
purpose of perpetuating the family and for its progress. Infertility is 
often a major cause of dispute between husband and wife. Idleness, 
irresponsibility, and laziness on the part of the children normally 
invite the dispute between husband and wife. Idleness, 
irresponsibility, and laziness on the part of the children normally 
invite the displeasure and disillusion of the father especially one who 
works hard to train the children. On the other hand, lack of provision 
of the basic utilities on the part of the head of the family who should 
be the breadwinner would occasion ill-feeling from the wife and the 
children. These are some of the causes of tension within the family. 
Settlement of disputes is normally through family dialogue. At the 
failure of this, the extended family (Umunna) and in some cases the 
clan and the in-laws would be invited to look into the matter. 
Reconciliation is usually the principal aim of such settlements since 
that would be the only favourable and desirable result of resolution 
of dispute between parties that are closely related and need each 
other. 
 
(v)  Inter-Town Clashes  
The traditional Igbo enclave was a closed society. The 
concept of neighbourhood and neighbourliness was highly a 
restricted one. The farther the blood ties, the more distant and 
shallower the friendliness. The result is that there were often mutual 
tension and hostility between neighbouring towns. More often than 
not, other towns and more distant clans were regarded as actual or 
potential enemies to be dealt with at the slightest provocation. No 
doubt, the ready-to-hand causes of this face-off or fisticuff include 
land boundary disputes, murder of a member of a particular town, 
maltreatment of a town’s daughter married out to another town, 
market quarrels, desecration of masquerades by members of another 
town, and so on. Resolution of this sort of conflicts took the form of 
negotiation and plea bargaining between the two towns. Often, 
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representations from the two towns would meet to iron out the 
differences. In the more recent times, the representatives would be 
led by the respective traditional rulers and cabinets. At the end, 
justice is done in terms of compensation, reparation, apology, and 
payment of damages. 
The above constitutes only a tip of an iceberg of the 
different fields that awaken the dispensation of Igbo sense of justice. 
It may however be appropriate to also note some important modes 
and means of settlements of disputes as employed by Igbo judicial 
system. We shall consider only three of these modes, namely, 
arbitration, oath-taking, and trial by ordeal. 
 
(a)  Arbitration  
Arbitration is a recognized means of settlement of dispute 
among the traditional Igbo. The contention of Allot that there is 
nothing like arbitration practice among the Nigerian peoples does 
not apply to the Igbo. For Allot, what is called arbitration among the 
traditional Nigerian peoples is a mere negotiation for settlement in 
which the parties thereto are always free to resile from the 
arrangement any time before the award is made.
17
 This view of Allot 
received a judicial stamp in the dictum of Uwaifo J.C.A (as he  then 
was) in the case of Okpurunwu v. Okpokam
18
 in which the learned 
judge held that “there is no concept known as customary or native 
arbitration in our jurisprudence”. 
Be that as it may, the above respective views of the legal 
scholar and the learned judge do not represent the correct picture of 
the situation. Among the Igbo, arbitration was the commonest means 
of dispute resolution in which the parties in lis agree to submit their 
dispute to the chiefs and elders of the community for the purpose of 
adjudication and redress, and wherein the parties feel themselves 
bound by the decision of the arbitrators. This practice paradoxically 
had also received a benediction from the Supreme Court which held 
in Egesimba v. Onuzurike
19
 thus: 
Customary arbitration by elders of the community is 
one of many African customary modes of settling 
disputes and once it satisfies the necessary 
requirements, the decision would have binding effect 




on the parties and this creates an estoppel. It is 
recognized under Nigerian jurisprudence. 
 
Even in Okpurunwu, Oguntade J.C.A (as he then was) while 
dissenting from the lead judgment by Uwaifo reiterated the existence 
of arbitration among the African natives: 
I find myself unable to accept the proposition that there 
is no concept known as customary or native arbitration 
in our jurisprudence….The right to freely choose an 
arbitrator to adjudicate with binding effect is not 
beyond our native communities…. 
 
Morestill, the Igbo customary arbitration is in tandem with 
the court’s definition of the practice in Agu v. Ikewibe
20
 as that 
“founded on the voluntary submission of the parties to the decision 
of the arbitrators who are either chiefs or elders of their communities 
and the agreement to be bound by such decision…” Therefore, 
arbitration practice among the Igbo people in particular
21
 and 
Nigerian peoples generally is not unknown to Nigerian 
jurisprudence. Fairly recently, the Supreme Court had to re-
emphasize its understanding of arbitration in NNPC v. Lutin 
Investment Ltd
22
 wherein it is seen as “the reference of a dispute or 
difference between not less than two parties for determination, after 
hearing both sides in a judicial manner, by person or persons other 
than a court of competent jurisdiction”. Besides, the Nigerian court’s 
description of arbitration is not an isolationist standpoint. It is quite 
congruous with that of scholarly non-indigenous authors and jurists 
on the subject. In the words of Fulton Maxwell J, 
Arbitration is a process whereby a private disinterested 
person called an arbitrator, chosen by the parties to a 
dispute…, acting in a judicial fashion but without 
regards to legal technicalities, applying either existing 
law or norms agreed by the parties, and acting in 
accordance with equity, good conscience and the 








Therefore, there is no gainsaying that what arbitration stands 
for everywhere is well represented in the Igbo practices. Okafor
24
 
describes the process of arbitration in traditional Igbo society. At the 
event of dispute the injured party may refer the matter to his 
kinsmen (Umnna) if the other party is also of the same kindred. 
Otherwise, or if it fails, the case could be reported to the village 
elders, age grade society, or recently the town union who serve as 
the arbitral panel. The panel is expected to invite the parties, fix the 
date and venue, and state the applicable procedure. The honouring of 
the invitation by the parties is a complete submission to the panel’s 
jurisdiction and hence agreement to be bound by the resultant award. 
Usually, the parties are expected to say the truth and the arbitrators 
to stand for justice. To ensure this, the arbitral process normally 
begins on a ritual and religious note as observed by green
25
 and 
which can thus be summarized: The two disputants are each required 
to bring palm wine. Before those present would begin to drink the 
palm wine, the eldest man takes a cup of the wine and pours it on the 
four “ofo” saying to the effect that whoever is guilty, let him be 
guilty, and whoever is not guilty, let him not be guilty. The second 
eldest man takes a small chicken brought by the defendant and 
holding it up, pulls its head off and lets the blood drip on the “ofo” 
and then throws it away, saying: “whoever sees the truth in this case, 
and does not say it, may ofo kill him! Whoever speaks a lie, may ofo 
kill him! Whoever hears a word in this case and does not speak it, 
may ofo kill him! Whoever does not judge aright, may ofo kill him’. 
At the end of each statement, all those present normally respond 
“Ha” or “Iha” meaning “let it be so!”  No doubt, the essence of the 
above religious ritual is to invoke and invite the supernatural to 
oversee and supervise the trial process. The trial itself follows the 
“hear-both-sides” rule of natural justice in which the plaintiff and the 
defendant would be heard in turn. The parties may also field in 
witnesses who are also heard. At the end, the panel hands on the 
award which is understood by the parties as binding on them. The 
arbitral award which normally orders restitution, compensation, 
apology, specific performance, etc in favour of the innocent party, if 
in civil matter, is binding on the guilty party failing which he is 




liable to ostracism. In criminal causes, depending on the gravity of 
the offence, fine, forfeiture, banishment, compensation or even death 
penalty may be meted out. Noteworthy is that this bindingness of 
traditional Igbo arbitral award inter alia distinguishes arbitration 
from other possible forms of dispute resolution mechanism among 
the people such as mediation, conciliation, reconciliation and so on. 
In these later forms where there is no stamp of finality, the parties 
are free to resile midway or at the end of the process. After all, what 
is envisaged is a mere negotiation for settlement. 
Thus, the above discussion shows that arbitration practice 
among the traditional Igbo possesses the essential features of 
customary arbitration. First, there is an agreement between parties 
(though sometimes implicit) to arbitrate. We refer to it as “implicit” 
since often it is only at the instance of one party that refers the 
matter to a panel that other agrees to arbitrate once he submits to the 
jurisdiction of the arbitral panel. Second, there is arbitration in line 
with the customary law of the parties. Third, there is the existence of 
the award and its publication. Certainly these three factors are 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s holdings about what the 
plaintiff needs to prove for the enforcement of the award. That is to 
say, in spite of the fact that the Supreme Court had enumerated in a 
number of decided cases
26
 different factors to be established by the 
plaintiff, yet the above three elements are recurrent and constitute 
the essential ones. But what is also salient is that all these cases 
emanated from the Igbo customary arbitral practice as evident from 
the names of the parties. This is a demonstration of the fact that 
dispensation of justice through arbitration is common place among 
the traditional Igbo. 
 
 
(b)  Oath-Taking 
It cannot be overstated that oath-taking is an acceptable 
practice and a common feature of customary law resolution of 
dispute in Africa generally and the Igbo in particular. In spite of 
western influences, oath-taking has survived as a legitimate judicial 
method which the Igbo believe as one of the assured ways of 
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obtaining absolute justice. Okogeri observes that oath-taking is an 
integral part of the Igbo custom by which the guilty and the innocent 
with regard to a dispute are exposed in view of maintenance of 
social equilibrium and cohesion.
27
 Edu, writing about the Igbo, 
rightly asserted that oath-taking is a common feature of resolving 
dispute. He notes that its use is very frequent in crime detection or as 
a last resort in settling other disputes such as land, adultery and 
defamation.
28
 Okafor also notes that oath-taking or swearing to a 
tutelary deity is usually called for in a protracted case where the 
intricacies of the matter make it difficult to discern who is right or 
wrong in a case.
29
 The prevalence of oath-taking among the Igbo in 
settlement of dispute is attested to by Oba who observes that 




Besides, oath-taking is a direct submission to the 
supernatural tribune for settlement of disputes and whose verdict is 
final. Man plays little or no part. Sometimes this appeal to the 
supernatural is made when human efforts fail or when no confidence 
is reposed on the human panel. This is practised in serious cases like 
murder, witchcraft, and in land matters. Okafor describes the 
procedure: 
As a legitimate legal action, the injured party may ask 
the accused to swear on tutelary deity of his (the 
injured) choice to prove his innocence…. On the other 
hand, the accused may opt to swear on any powerful 
“Alusi” in order to free himself from the accusation. If 
the plaintiff accepts the accused’s offer to swear, he is 
bound to regard the dispute as closed and to await for 
the supernatural judgement…. The perjurer may die as 
the result or he may suffer grave misfortune or illness. 
The more dreadful consequence is that the perjurer’s 
family and sometimes, the entire village may suffer 
from some obscure illness which may put the lineage in 




In the same vein, Nwakoby observes that in oath-taking 
among the Igbo, time is normally given within which the offending 




party is expected to either be killed by the gods or be sick so as to 
confirm that he is the offending party.
32
 Guilt or innocence is 
established depending on whether or not the accused dies or falls 
sick within the time given. Generally, the oaths are worded in such a 
way that the swearer invokes on himself a conditional curse. He tells 
the juju to punish him if he lies. After then, all the disputing parties 
wait for a year. The Igbo believe that anyone who swears falsely will 
be dead or struck with great misfortune within the time limit. In a 
land dispute, the person who swears to the oath enters and takes 
possession of the land. But if any misfortune befalls him within one 
year, the res will revert to the other party. If however he survives the 
prescribed time, the swearer retains the property as he is deemed to 
have told the truth. Where a party was ordered to proffer a juju for 




More still, the use of oaths swearing displaces the need to 
weigh oral evidence of the parties and their witnesses. Okany 
observes that given the swearing to an oath, the dispute will not 
normally be taken to court again, but the relatives of the diseased 
who is believed to have sworn falsely will surrender the disputed 
property or right to the other party. In some cases, the entire estate of 
the deceased party will be surrendered to the juju by which he swore, 




(c )  Trial by Ordeal 
Trial by ordeal is yet another common means of settling 
dispute among the traditional African generally and the Igbo in 
particular. Talbot writing about peoples of Southern Nigeria, regards 
trials by ordeal among them as one of the greatest safeguards of 
justice”.
35
 The Igbo practice is ad rem to the Black’s Law Dictionary 
description of trial by ordeal: 
A primitive form of trial in which an accused was 
subjected to a dangerous or painful physical test, the 
result being considered a divine revelation of the 
person’s guilt or innocence. The participants believed 
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that God would reveal a person’s culpability by 




This view corroborates the observation of Elias in relation to 
Nigerian, nay, Igbo peoples as regards the various ways in which 
trial by ordeals can be carried out: 
The ordeal might take the form of the juice of a tree (eg 
sass wood) mixed with water, or a burnt powder made 
from it and dissolved in water; a knife or other piece of 
iron might be heated in a fire; the culprit might be taken 
to a nearby pond or stream. The guilty one is he who 
should drink the water and become sick, handle the red-





Penwill writing about the Kamba people notes that trial by 
ordeals is most used in not only criminal cases but particularly in 
cases of theft and murder when the culprit is unknown.
38
 Even in 
fairly recent times, Igbo trial by ordeal has been applied to 
witchcraft cases. Also widows who were suspected of having killed 
their husbands were subjected to one form of trial by ordeal or the 
other.  Sometimes, the accused was forced to drink the bath-water 
used in washing the corpse of the diseased. The belief is that she 
would die if she is guilty; otherwise her innocence would be 
established if unharmed. The Igbo widow faced other forms of trial 
by ordeal such as being locked up over night with her husband’s 
corpse, not being allowed to touch her body with her hands as she 
constantly held sticks or knife in the hand, taken naked to shrine for 
purification, not being allowed to take her bath for 7 market days (28 
days), forced to do early morning cries so as to wake neighbours up 
for at least 7 days, and so on. In line with these practices, an Igbo 
widow, Cecilia Akuego-Onwu recounts her recent personal 
experience of a trial by ordeal at the demise of her husband: 
I was forced to sit near the corpse of my husband till 
daybreak. They (his relations) put kola nut on his chest 
and forced me to eat it. They made it compulsory that I 
must eat without washing my hands or clearing my 




teeth for seven-market days, equivalent to one calendar 
month. On every market day, about three o’clock in the 
morning, they sent an old widow to escort me with a 
lamp to a nearby river to take a bath. This according to 
them meant that if I killed my husband, he would come 




Similarly, the goal of the above ordeals is that if the widow 
was privy to the death of the husband, then in respective cases, the 
dead husband would use the knive or the stick to kill the widow, or 
the widow would die from the eating of the kola nut, or from any of 
the tortures or treatments mentioned above. 
Such as the above constitute the main lines along which the 
traditional Igbo practice justice and settle their disputes. One thing 
recurrent however is the fact of the religious or ritualistic 
underpinning in which the practices are enmeshed. Whether in 
arbitration, oath-taking, or trial by ordeal, the reference to the 
supernatural is always made. This is typically illustrated in a 
fictitious civil trial recorded in Achebe’s Things Fall Apart.
40
 This 
was a matrimonial case between Uzowulu and Mgbafor. In this case, 
the Egwugwu oracles which symbolized judicial authority and power 
presided. The petitioner and respondent presented their cases and 
witnesses from both sides testified. After series of arguments and 
counter-arguments, the nine Egwugwu oracles went underground to 
consult after which they reappeared and passed their judgment. In 
much of Igbo justice systems, the primary motif is to effect 
reconciliation between disputants. This is well demonstrated in the 
judgement of the Egwugwu who in the instant case held that “our 
duty is not to blame this man or to praise that one but to settle the 
dispute”. This is true as they commanded the petitioner to go to his 
in-laws with a pot of palm-wine to implore his wife to return to him, 
and in the same way ordered the defendants to accept such wine 
should the in-laws bring it and let their sister go with them.
41
 It 
should be noted that it is only when human reconciliation becomes 
extremely difficult or impossible that recourse is directly made to 
trial by ordeal or oath-taking. Sometimes however, some of the cases 
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by way of latter methods are believed to be outside the jurisdiction 
of man. In what immediately follows, let us see the attitude and 
challenges posed to Igbo traditional jurisprudence by the prevailing 
Nigerian legal system today. 
 
6. Attitudes and Challenges of Nigerian Legal System to 
Traditional Igbo Justice System 
Surely, the relationship of the Nigerian English-style system 
and the tradition Igbo regime of justice dispensation is that of master 
and servant. Precisely as a chunk of colonial legacy, the Nigeria 
legal system regards the Nigerian customary laws generally as 
inferior and thus adopts an a la carte approach with regard to the 
acceptance and enforcement of traditional systems. The former picks 
and chooses which aspects of the latter to abolish, suppress or 
enforce depending on whether or not those aspects are supportive of 
its interests. Although Nigeria gained independence from the British 
rule nearly five decades ago, much of its laws and judicial methods 
remain largely western. In the heydays of colonialism, laws made for 
the colonies were styled in such a way that they either promoted the 
objectives of the colonial overloads or made not to injure the 
psycho-social sensibilities of the masters. The effect is that today, 
partly as a result of irresponsibity but also partly due to neo-colonial 
and cargo-cult mentality, the autochthonous ruling elites have 
maintained almost wholesale the provisions of the colonial laws for 
governance even up till today.
42
 The domino effect is that much of 
the colonialist antipathy to traditional customs is still retained in the 
Nigerian legal and judicial systems. Such retention no doubt 
harbours advantages and disadvantages. But a good piece of work 
would have been to promote the advantages and suppress the 
disadvantages while still adopt good foreign influences, rather than 
maintain a near rigid framework.  
Certainly, Nigerian customary laws are saved by the 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigerian 1999 as part of the 
“existing law”.
43
 But that is only a generalized blanket provision of a 
legal make-belief. In actual practice, customary laws are made 
subject to the overriding provisions of the Nigerian English-type 
laws. For one thing, the whole of customary criminal justice had 




been abolished by the effects of section 36 (12) of the Constitution 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. The section provides that 
“…a person shall not be convicted of a criminal offence unless that 
offence is defined and the penalty therefor prescribed in a written 
law…” and which written law refers to the Acts of the National 
Assembly or a Law of a State, any subsidiary legislation or 
instrument under the provisions of a law. The implication is that all 
unwritten crimes and all crimes not created together with their 
penalties by any of the aforementioned legislative authorities or 
belonging to any of the aforementioned groups of laws do not 
qualify to be part of Nigerian body of criminal laws. This means that 
traditional Igbo criminal jurisprudence like any other customary 
criminal justice one of which characteristics is that it is unwritten is 
constitutionally outlawed. Thus, all forms of criminal trials by 
ordeal, by arbitration, and by oath-taking are thereby abolished. This 
abolition of customary criminal justice is given an added fillip by yet 
another provision at section 36 (4) of the Constitution. The section 
requires, among other things, that “whenever any person is charged 
with a criminal offence, he is entitled to a fair hearing in public by a 
court or tribunal established by law”. No doubt, this is a bar to Igbo 
traditional criminal courts which are neither established by law nor 
are their trials conducted in public. For one thing, attending the 
sessions and watching the proceedings are not open to all since 
women and children are often not allowed to participate. Because of 
this provision, traditional Igbo criminal trials whether by arbitration, 
oath-taking, or trial by ordeal which often take place in camera are 
rendered illegal. 
Be that as it may, customary civil justice still enjoys the 
sympathy of the prevailing Nigerian judicial and legal systems. 
Hence, the courts recognize the validity of customary arbitration 
practice as we noted above. They also accord legitimacy to 
traditional methods of civil dispute resolution based on oath-taking. 
Although there are discordant and conflicting judicial voices with 
regard to oath-taking, yet long line of decided cases attracted judicial 
blessings on the practice especially in matters of arbitration and 
private dispute settlements. In Charles Ume v. Godfrey Okoronkwo 





 a case emanating from a native arbitration in respect of 
title to the land in dispute, Oguegbu J.S.C. while delivering the lead 
judgement stated, inter alia, that “oath-taking was one of the 
methods of establishing the truth of a matter and was known to 
customary law and accepted by both parties”. Again, in Ofomata & 
ors v. Anoka
45
 in which the legal validity of oath- taking was in 
issue, Agbakoba J held that 
Oath-taking is a recognized and accepted form of proof 
existing in certain customary judicature. Oath may be 
sworn extra-judicial but as a mode of judicial proof, its 
esoteric and reverential feature, the solemnity of the 
choice of an oath by the disputants and imminent evil 
visitation to the oath breaker if he swore falsely, are the 
deterrent sanctions of this form of customary judicial 
process which commends it alike to rural and urban 
indigenous courts. It is therefore my view that the 
decision to swear an oath is not illegal although it may 
be obnoxious to Christian ethics…. 
 
Similarly, in the land case of Okere v. Nwoke,
46
 the 
respondent admitted the custom of settling dispute by oath-taking. 
Thus, the appellants having been led to take oath on the “Aka Obibi 
Juju” provided by the 3
rd
 defendant at great risk to their lives in the 
belief that the customary oath would settle the dispute, the 
respondents are estopped by conduct from denying that appellants 
were thereby adjudged owners of the land, the latter having sworn to 
the oath for over a year. Recently, the validity of oath-taking in the 
process of customary law arbitration was reiterated by the Supreme 
Court in the land dispute case of John Onyenge & Ors v Loveday 
Ebere & Ors.
47
 The Supreme Court upheld the verdict of a lower 
court, which was based on the oath taken on the “Ogwugwu Akpu” 
of Okija in Anambra State. In this case, Niki Tobi J.S.C. delivering 
the lead judgment (unanimously concurred to by other Justices) 
reaffirmed the court’s recognition of oath-taking as “a valid process 
under customary law arbitration”.
48
 
Curiously however, some holdings of the courts in some 
cases show that the courts, after all, have not spoken with one voice 




in respect of oath-taking in customary arbitration. In a long line of 
decided cases still, the courts denied validity to oath-taking as a 
means of settlement of dispute. For instance, in Iwuchukwu v. 
Anyanwu,
49
 Ndoma – Egba J. C. A stated: 
The belief of the learned trial judge that disputes are 
decided by swearing “Juju” may be true as a matter of 
the past. In this century, that will be a retreat to trial by 
ordeal which is unthinkable any more than swearing 
‘Juju’ as a method of proof. We cannot now reel back 
to superstitious fear and foreswear our religious faith. 
 
Again, in Onwuanunkpa v. Onwuanunkpa,
50
 the court 
blatantly condemned practice of arbitration based on oath-taking as 
not being arbitration at all. More recently, the Supreme Court 
exhibited this attitude in Umeano Achiakpa & Anor v. Nduka & 
Ors.
51
 In this case, the appellants instituted an action in the High 
Court against the respondents claiming a declaration of title to land. 
The claim was founded inter alia on a judgment of the native court 
delivered in 1925 which was admitted in evidence as Exhibit C. The 
native court, however, did not order the parties to swear to the juju, 
but rather ordered the oath to be taken by a third party from whom 
the respondents traced their title. The issue before the High Court 
was whether or not the Exhibit C constituted estoppel per rem 
judicatam. The High Court held it did not. The Court of Appeal and 
the Supreme Court confirmed this. The High Court, the Court of 
Appeal and the Supreme Court refused to accept the native tribunal’s 
decision to refer the case to a juju as a judicial determination of the 
case. The Supreme Court citing with approval the decision of the 
Court of Appeal held that “…a judgment which enjoins the parties to 
swear to a juju on to do further acts ascertained or unascertained in 
order to determine where the merits of the case lie is not a final 
judgment as it is not a pronouncement on the rights of the parties 
which are in dispute and it cannot operate as estoppel per rem 
judicatam”.
52
 It seems that by this statement, the courts make the 
distinction between the situation of settlement based on oath-taking 
before the court is seized with the matter and that of the court 
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ordering an oath-taking and depending on the result for a judicial 
determination of the case before it. To this extent, the courts have 
very strong points. However, it seems that the courts never adverted 
their minds to the fact that native court system was designed to be a 
judicial elongation and arm of the traditional political system 
administering substantial justice almost in the same manner as the 
local communities. Besides, the Supreme Court’s approach is 
premised on the common law methodology which places more 
emphasis on evaluation of evidence by the judge rather than on 
preternatural sanctions which constitute the quintessence of 
traditional oaths. In our considered view, what the courts would have 
done is to determine whether the parties at the point of the native 
court’s order accepted the finality of the settlement of dispute 
consequent upon oath-taking so as to operate as estoppel per rem 
judicatam. For us, the decisions of the courts in Umeano Achiakpa v. 
Nduka are tantamount to a rejection of settlement based on oath-
taking. 
Furthermore, some scholars have expressed their 
disapproval against oath-taking as a means of traditional justice 
administration. These opinions are well represented by Nwakoby’s. 
The arbitration expert anchors his views on oath-taking on 
customary arbitration practice. He argues that since an important 
feature of arbitration award is finality, any arbitral award based on 
oath-taking is not good as the award is conditional and contingent 
and becomes effective only after the prescribed time in relation to 
the oath-taking. He also holds that there is no test of efficacy of the 
oath as the medical condition and state of health of the oath-taker is 
neither ascertained nor possibility of accident considered, and which 
might result to the death of the swearer even within the time 
prescribed. Again, for him, the entire exercise of oath-taking 
crumbles at the application of an antidote (ndagbu iyi) which 
possibility is well known to certain people. Nwakoby finally states 
that practice of oath-taking is not only fetish, barbaric, uncivilized, 
outdated, anachronistic, criminal, illegal but also contrary to 
Nigerian jurisprudence as it is superstitious, mysterious, and 
spiritualistic
53
 in a society that is supposed to be dynamic and not 
static. 




Certainly, much of the above observations of Nwakoby is 
quite salient and harbours some merits. Yet it cannot be denied that 
even up till today in spite of western education and Christianity, 
many Igbo people still resort to oath-taking as a means of dispute 
settlement and which is given recognition by courts. As such, the 
practice is not outdated or anachronistic. Besides, it would not be 
fair to the traditional society for its practices to be judged using the 
parameters of western standards. Using such adjectives as barbaric, 
fetish or uncivilized to qualify the traditional oath-taking would not 
do as such is tantamount to evaluating it ab extra which attitude is 
not acceptable in studies in cultural anthropology. The traditional 
people need not embrace the western culture in toto in order to be 
civilized or get developed. Regarding oath-taking as criminal and 
illegal is certainly not correct as the practice is saved and 
accommodated within modern Nigerian legal system as a form of 
statutory oath by virtue of the Oath Acts and laws. Even though the 
courts do not sometimes attach serious importance to oath-taking in 
judicial proceedings,
54
 yet the fact that a person may take an oath in 
such a manner that he considers binding on him
55
 is a confirmation 
of statutory preservation of traditional oath-taking. In Kwara State, 
the Oaths and Affirmation Law provides that an oath may be offered 
to the other party challenging him to support his allegation by 
swearing to a traditional form of oath.
56
 Therefore, in spite of the 
ambivalent attitudes of the courts, both civil arbitration and justice 
system based on oath-taking are known and recognized by Nigerian 
jurisprudence. Yet as we earlier noted, the a la carte treatment meted 
to traditional justice system boxes it into the corner of a slave 
serving the interest of its master. This is made manifest in many a 
legal provision. 
First and foremost, the traditional customary laws are 
relegated to the level of facts to be proved before the English-style 
court. In other words, even though Igbo customary laws, for 
instance, constitute a “mirror of accepted usage”
57
 they are not 
regarded as laws which attitude is statutorily enshrined in Nigerian 
evidence law and practice.
58
 Hence, while one need not prove the 
other laws in courts as the judge is taken to have known them, one 
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needs to establish the customary laws as he would facts by adducing 
evidence either by calling witnesses or by way of manuals and 
books
59
 unless in situations where the courts had taken judicial 
notice of the custom.
60
 The implication is that the judge is regarded 
as not being aware of the customary laws of his own people as the 
proof would still be required even if the judge comes from the same 
customary area with the parties. 
Secondly, local customs are subjected to certain validity 
tests through which they must pass for them to be enforced. Thus, 
traditional customs must not be repugnant to natural justice, equity 
and good conscience. They must not be incompatible to any known 
written law. And they must not be contrary to public policy.
61
 
Although this judicial attitude has helped to suppress certain 
obnoxious practices, yet it is not without paying the price of 
subjecting the indigenous customs to the servitude position of 
kowtowing the neo-colonial legal regime operating in Nigeria today. 
Therefore, it goes without saying that the Igbo customary 
justice system is neither here nor there. It is allowed to operate only 
insofar as it pays a poll tax similar to that paid by a conquered 
people to their conquerors for the latter to allow the former to exist. 
The customary system is allowed to operate provided it does not 
conflict with the interest and operation of the received English 
method that is regarded as all-too superior. The effect is that the 
indigenous framework is quite vulnerable and susceptible to be 
abolished at any time by the simplest legislative act which may not 
be diligent enough to carry out a proper study of the situation. 
 
7 Conclusion and Recommendation 
In the course of the above discussions, this paper has been 
able to identify the principles and practices of the Igbo sense of 
justice and judicial system. It is discovered that the Igbo have a very 
rich notion of justice which quintessence is precipitated into its 
reconciliatory, communal, social, and religious nature. However, this 
indigenous idea of justice is primordially anchored on a traditional 
worldview that is fast undergoing rapid transformation due to 
contact with western culture. This contact which is packaged in a 
colonial baggage gave birth to a judicial methodology that 




superimposes itself on the autochthonous system. Yet even as it is 
true that the Igbo of today is a hybrid, some aspects of its customs 
including judicial practices still die hard. The compromise stance of 
genuine socio-cultural symbiosis between the two judicial systems 
would have been the panacea. Since it is important to respond to the 
comprehensive judicial need of the Igbo person, it is quite apt to 
indigenize and inculturate the received English system. This will 
require a diligent study of the traditional ways in view of a proper 
integration with the prevailing English-style mode. There is also the 
urgent necessity to drop the cargo-cult mindset by which everything 
western is deemed the better in relation to the native counterpart. 
Certainly, no culture is a finished product. By means of diffusion 
and borrowings, each culture adjusts itself in order to still be 
relevant to its people. Justice systems no doubt are an important 
aspect of this process. Rather than maintaining the prevailing 
posture, the Nigerian judicial system would be better for it if the 
babies of the home-made and received styles are respectively saved 
as though in a good marriage while throwing away their bath waters.                                         
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